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Abstract
A real X is defined to be relatively c.e. if there is a real Y such that
X is c.e.(Y ) and X 6≤T Y . A real X is relatively simple and above if
there is a real Y <T X such that X is c.e.(Y ) and there is no infinite set
Z ⊆ X such that Z is c.e.(Y ). We prove that every nonempty Π01 class
contains a member which is not relatively c.e. and that every 1-generic
real is relatively simple and above.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the following question: For which X ∈ 2ω is there a
Y such that X is c.e.(Y ) but X 6≤T Y ? Such reals X are said to be relatively
computably enumerable. Similarly, we can also look at which reals hold other
basic properties (such as being simple) relative to another real. We briefly
summarize some known results and prove two new theorems on the topic.
We begin with some definitions.
Definition 1. A real X is relatively c.e. if there is a real Y such that X is
c.e.(Y ) and X 6≤T Y .
Definition 2. A real X is relatively c.e.a. (computably enumerable and above)
if there is a Y <T X such that X is c.e.(Y ).
Definition 3. A real X is relatively s.a. (simple and above) if there is a real
Y <T X such that X is c.e.(Y ) and there is no infinite set Z ⊆ X such that Z
is c.e.(Y ).
Definition 4. For reals A and B, we say A ≤e B (A is enumeration below B)
if there is a Σ1 set C such that n ∈ A iff there is a finite E ⊆ B (as a set) with
(n,E) ∈ C.
Definition 5. A real X is 1-generic if for every Σ1 set S ⊆ 2<ω either X meets
S or for some k ∈ ω, every σ ⊇ X ↾ k is such that σ /∈ S.
Jockusch [5] proved that every 1-generic real is relatively c.e.a., and Kurtz
[8] showed that the set of relatively c.e.a. reals has measure one. Kautz [7]
improved this by demonstrating that all 2-random reals are relatively c.e.a.
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While the set of relatively c.e. reals seems very large, there is a natural limit
to its size. Given any real X , we can find a real Y in the same truth-table degree
such that Y is not relatively c.e. We simply let Y code the initial segments of X .
More generally, a real X is not relatively c.e. any time X ≤e X . It follows from
a result of Selman [9] that this is the only case in which a real is not relatively
c.e.
Theorem 1.1 (Selman [9]). X is relatively c.e. if and only if X 6≤e X.
Selman’s result shows that the set of relatively c.e. reals is, in some sense,
as large as possible.
Jockusch showed, in a paper by Case [2], that every Turing degree contains a
real X such that X 6≤e X , and hence by Theorem 1.1, that every Turing degree
contains a real which is relatively c.e. If we apply this to a minimal degree, we
have a real which is relatively c.e. but not relatively c.e.a. For recent results on
relatively c.e.a. reals, see Ambos-Spies, Ding, Wang, and Yu [1].
Jockusch and Soare [6] showed that every nonempty Π01 class contains a
real which has hyperimmune-free degree and hence is not relatively c.e.a. We
sharpen this by showing every nonempty Π01 class contains a real which is not
relatively c.e. We also improve Jockusch’s [5] result that every 1-generic real is
relatively c.e.a., by proving that every 1-generic real is relatively s.a.
This work formed part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis at the University of
California at Berkeley. We thank Theodore Slaman, the dissertation supervisor,
for his ideas on the topic and his repeated suggestions of new approaches to
problems.
2 Π01 Classes
Theorem 2.1. Every nonempty Π01 class contains a member which is not rel-
atively c.e.
Proof. Let T be a computable tree such that the members of the Π01 class are
the paths through T . We will inductively construct a real X which will be
the rightmost path through T and a set C which will witness X ≤e X . The
procedure will be computable and we will only add elements to C. Hence C will
be c.e.
We begin with X0 = 〈〉 and C0 = ∅. At stage s+1, if Xas 1 ∈ T we let Xs+1 =
Xas 1 and Cs+1 = Cs. Otherwise, let l be greatest such that (Xs ↾ l)
a0 ∈ T (l
must exist since the class is nonempty). We then let Xs+1 = (Xs ↾ l)
a0 and
Cs+1 = Cs ∪ (l, {n < l | Xs(n) = 1}).
We observe that X is the rightmost path through T (we set X(m) = 0 if
and only if there is no path through T extending (X ↾ m)a1). We wish to show
for all m ∈ ω that m /∈ X if and only if (m,E) ∈ C for some finite E ⊂ X
(viewed as a set). Suppose m /∈ X . Let s be least such that for all t > s we
have Xs ↾ m = Xt ↾ m. Then (m, {n < m | X(n) = 1}) was added to C at stage
s+ 1.
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Conversely, suppose E ⊂ X and (m,E) was added to C at stage s. We note
that the value of X at n does not change from 0 to 1 unless the value of X at k
changes from 1 to 0 for some k < n. As a result, if Xs ↾ m 6= Xt ↾ m for some
t > s, then {n < m | Xs(n) = 1} 6⊆ {n < m | X(n) = 1}. This implies E 6⊆ X
for a contradiction. We conclude Xs ↾ m = X ↾ m, and hence m /∈ X .
Therefore C witnesses X ≤e X , so by Theorem 1.1 we have that X is not
relatively c.e.
Given any property such that there is a nonempty Π01 class of reals that have
the property, we can apply Theorem 2.1 to find a real with this property which
is not relatively c.e. For example, it provides alternate proofs that there are 1-
random reals and Schnorr trivial reals that are not relatively c.e. (Franklin and
Stephan [4] constructed a Π01 class, all of whose members are Schnorr trivial).
Using the contrapositive of Theorem 2.1, we have alternate proofs that there is
no Π01 class of 1-generics or 2-randoms.
3 Relatively Simple and Above
Theorem 3.1. Let X be 1-generic. Then X is relatively s.a.
Proof. Let 〈, 〉 be a computable pairing function such that 〈m,n〉 > m for all
m,n. Let Y = {〈n,m〉 | n ∈ X ∧ 〈n,m〉 /∈ X}. Then Y ≤T X , and we have
that X is c.e.(Y ), since n ∈ X if and only if ∃m [〈n,m〉 ∈ Y ] (since X is generic,
we can’t have 〈n,m〉 ∈ X for every m). It remains to show that there is no
infinite Z ⊆ X such that Z is c.e.(Y ) [this also gives X 6≤T Y , since X ≤T Y
implies X is c.e.(Y )].
Suppose towards a contradiction there is an infinite Z ⊆ X such that Z =
WYk for some k. We define a function j : 2
<ω → 2<ω such that Y = j(X). Let
[j(σ)](〈n,m〉) = 1 iff σ(n) = 1 and σ(〈n,m〉) = 0.
To prove the theorem, we will use the facts that X ∩W
j(X)
k = ∅ and X is
1-generic. This implies there is an initial segment X ↾ l such that for every
extension τ ⊇ X ↾ l we have τ ∩W
j(τ)
k = ∅. We will then get a contradiction
by adding an element of W
j(τ)
k to τ without changing j(τ).
Let S = {σ | ∃n [n ∈ σ ∧ n ∈ W
j(σ)
k ]}. Then X /∈ S, so let l be such that
for every τ extending X ↾ l we have τ /∈ S. Since Z is infinite, let p ∈ Z with
p > l, and let t > l be such that p ∈ W
j(X↾t)
k . We note that for any σ ⊇ X ↾ l
such that j(σ) = j(X ↾ t), we have p ∈W
j(σ)
k and σ /∈ S, so p /∈ σ. We can now
obtain a contradiction.
Claim. There is a σ ⊇ X ↾ l such that j(σ) = j(X ↾ t) and p ∈ σ.
Proof. We define a sequence of strings σi of length t inductively. Let σ0 = X ↾ t.
Let σ1 be given by
σ1(n) =
{
1 n = p
σ0(n) else
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At each stage we will remove all witnesses of changes made in the previous stage.
For each stage i ≥ 2 we define σi by
σi(〈b, a〉) =
{
1 σi−1(b) 6= σi−2(b)
σi−1(〈b, a〉) else
We note that since 〈b, a〉 > b, the least m such that σi(m) 6= σi−1(m) strictly
increases with i. Hence for some stage i we have σi = σi−1, and we let σ be this
σi. We also note that this procedure never changes a 1 to a 0.
We have p ∈ σ and note that σ ⊇ X ↾ l since p > l. It remains to show that
j(σ) = j(X ↾ t).
Let n,m be arbitrary such that [j(X ↾ t)](〈n,m〉) = 1. Then X(n) = 1 and
X(〈n,m〉) = 0; so at every stage i, σi(n) = 1 and σi(〈n,m〉) = σi−1(〈n,m〉).
Hence σ(n) = 1 and σ(〈n,m〉) = 0 so [j(σ)](〈n,m〉) = 1.
Conversely, let n,m be arbitrary such that [j(σ)](〈n,m〉) = 1. Then σ(n) = 1
and σ(〈n,m〉) = 0. The latter implies X(〈n,m〉) = 0. Suppose X(n) = 0. Let
i be least such that σi(n) = 1. Then σi+1(〈n,m〉) = 1, so σ(〈n,m〉) = 1 for a
contradiction. Hence X(n) = 1 so [j(X ↾ t)](〈n,m〉) = 1.
Therefore j(σ) = j(X ↾ t).
Thus, there is no infinite Z ⊆ X which is c.e.(Y ). Therefore X is relatively
s.a.
4 Conclusion
There is still room to investigate relatively c.e. reals. One question we can
consider is: Is there a 1-random X 6≥T ∅′ such that X is not relatively c.e.?
By Franklin and Ng [3] this is equivalent to the question: Is there a difference
random which is not relatively c.e.? The approach used in this paper cannot
be used directly to answer this question. The real constructed by applying
Theorem 2.1 to a Π01 class of 1-randoms is Turing complete (as is Chaitin’s Ω).
Similarly, we can ask: Is there a weakly 2-random real which is not relatively
c.e.? We can also look at further classifying which reals are relatively s.a.
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